Pledge-and-review in the laboratory

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Lippert, Steffen; Tremewan, James
• 署名单位: University of Auckland; University of Auckland; University of Auckland; University of Auckland
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.003
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 179-195
• 关键词: Pledge and review; public goods; Voluntary contributions; Conditional cooperation

摘要

We perform a laboratory test of Pledge-and-Review bargaining, implementing a simplified version of the model analysed in Harstad (2021a). In theory, this institution should increase contributions to a public good only if there is uncertainty over the value of possible future payoffs. In contrast, we find that Pledge-and-Review increases efficiency in all the settings we investigate, and that the improvement is most persistent in our setting without uncertainty. Our results suggest that the Pledge-and-Review institution may be useful, even without uncertainty, as it allows conditional cooperators to test, risk free, the cooperativeness of their partners. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.