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作者：Xu, Haibo
作者单位：Tongji University
摘要：We study a dynamic game in which a financial expert seeks to optimize the utilization of her private information either by information disclosure to an investor or by self-use. The investor may be aligned or biased: an aligned investor always cooperates with the expert, whereas a biased investor may strategically betray the expert. We characterize the joint dynamics of the expert's information disclosure and the investor's type revelation and show that, by disclosing her information gradually,...
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作者：Okada, Akira
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We consider a non-cooperative decentralized matching game as sequential bargaining. A protocol-free equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium which is robust to a choice of a bargaining protocol. We show that a matching is generated in a protocol-free equilibrium if and only if it is stable. The bargaining game can be applied to a wide class of matching problems including marriage problems, college admissions problems, matching with contracts, assignment games, and cooperative NTU games. (C...
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作者：Crawford, Vincent P.
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper revisits Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) classic analysis of mechanism design for bilateral trading, replacing equilibrium with a level-k model of strategic thinking and focusing on direct mechanisms. The revelation principle fails for level-k models, so restricting attention to direct mechanisms and imposing incentive-compatibility are not without loss of generality. If, however, only direct, level-k-incentive-compatible mechanisms are feasible and traders' levels are observable...
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作者：Huang, Xuesong
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：This paper extends the exact equivalence result between the allocations realized by self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations equilibrium allocations in Forges and Minelli (1997) to a large finite-agent replica economy where different replicas of the same agent are allowed to receive different private information. The first result states that the allocation realized by any incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanism is an approximate rational expectations equilibrium allocation. ...
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作者：Sano, Ryuji
作者单位：Yokohama National University
摘要：This study considers a mechanism design problem in which service slots are allocated over time to buyers arriving in different periods. Buyers have a multidimensional type representing their valuation and patience level. Some buyers can accept delayed service, whereas others cannot. The seller fully commits to a deterministic mechanism. We show that a mechanism is periodic ex-post incentive compatible if and only if the allocation rule is monotone in valuation and price equivalence holds. The ...
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作者：Solan, Eilon; Zhao, Chang
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Nanjing Audit University
摘要：Often monitoring agencies (principal) do not have enough resources to monitor all agents, and violations are unavoidable. Questions arise regarding the structure of the monitoring scheme that minimizes the rate of violations. In dynamic monitoring problems, the principal can use the past behavior of agents to determine her monitoring policy. In this paper, we identify the optimal dynamic monitoring scheme when the principal has a commitment power, and show that in this scheme agents first comp...
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作者：Belhaj, Mohamed; Deroian, Frederic
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：A monopoly sells a network good to a large population of consumers. We explore how the monopoly's profit and the consumer surplus vary with the arrival of public information about the network structure. The analysis reveals that, under homogeneous preferences for the good, degree assortativity ensures that information arrival increases both profit and consumer surplus. In contrast, heterogeneous preferences for the good can create a tension between consumer surplus and profit. (C) 2021 Elsevie...
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作者：Bonifacio, Agustin G.; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：As was pointed out to us by Huaxia Zeng, Theorem 1 in Bonifacio and Masso (2020), is not correct. In this note we recall former Theorem 1, exhibit a counterexample of its statement, identify the mistake in its faulty proof, and state and prove the new version of Theorem 1. At the end we give an alternative proof of Lemma 9, whose former proof used incorrectly Lemma 5. Notation and definitions are as in the section of Preliminaries in Bonifacio and Masso (2020). (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All right...
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作者：Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of British Columbia; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Delay after disagreement in committee decision making may foster information aggregation but is costly ex post. When there is an upper bound on delay that can be credibly imposed, repeated delays can improve the ex ante welfare of committee members. An ex ante optimal dynamic delay mechanism does not impose the maximum credible delay after each disagreement. Instead, it induces in equilibrium start-and-stop cycles where players alternate between making the maximum concession to avoid disagreem...
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作者：Pereira, Ana Elisa
作者单位：Universidad de los Andes - Chile
摘要：This paper studies information disclosure when financial supervisors cannot commit to communicate truthfully. A regulator performs a stress test and chooses whether to disclose bank-specific or aggregate results. Results can be biased at a cost (the higher this cost, the more credible the regulator). Manipulating aggregate information may avoid bank failures, but only if credibility is high enough. Supervisors with little credibility cannot prevent systemic runs by misreporting aggregate infor...
