Simultaneous auctions with budgets: Equilibrium existence and characterization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ghosh, Gagan
• 署名单位: California State University System; California State University Fullerton
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.002
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 75-93
• 关键词: Simultaneous auctions; Private budgets; Multi-dimensional types; better-reply security

摘要

We study the sale of two units of a good through simultaneous sealed bid first price auctions to bidders who have private types and multi-unit demand. Bidders are differentiated based on their valuations and budgets. Under a parametric restriction, we show that this auction game is better-reply secure and thus possesses a Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, bidders expend their budgets. The equilibrium strategies are essentially pure in the sense that each bidder-type has a unique split (up to a permutation) of her budget between the two auctions. In equilibrium, there always exist bidder-types who submit unequal bids in equilibrium even though they have the same valuations for the units. In addition, the equilibrium is monotone in valuations and budgets: bidders with higher valuations (lower budgets) prefer more unequal splits of their budgets than bidders with lower valuations (higher budgets) and the same budget (valuation). (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.