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作者：Glaetzle-Ruetzler, Daniela; Lergetporer, Philipp; Sutter, Matthias
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; Technical University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Max Planck Society; University of Cologne; University of Innsbruck; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Many important intertemporal decisions are made by groups rather than individuals. What happens to collective decisions when there is internal conflict about the tradeoff between present and future has not been thoroughly investigated so far. We study experimentally the causal effect of group members' heterogeneous payoffs from waiting on intertemporal choices. We find that three-person groups behave more patiently than individuals. This effect stems from the presence of at least one group mem...
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作者：Boix-Adsera, Enric; Edelman, Benjamin L.; Jayanti, Siddhartha
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We initiate the study of the natural multiplayer generalization of the classic continuous Colonel Blotto game. The two-player Blotto game, introduced by Borel (1953) as a model of resource competition across n simultaneous fronts, has been studied extensively for a century and has seen numerous applications throughout the social sciences. Our work defines the multiplayer Colonel Blotto game and derives Nash equilibria for various settings of k (number of players) and n. We also introduce a Boo...
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作者：Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Turku; University of Glasgow; University of Naples Federico II; University of Helsinki
摘要：The designer's exercise consists of designing a rights structure that formalizes the idea of power distribution in society. A solution is implementable in largest consistent set by a rights structure if there exists a rights structure such that for each preference profile, the largest consistent set of the game played by agents coincides with the set of outcomes that the solution would select for it. In a setting with transfers, every Maskin monotonic solution is implementable. This finding im...
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作者：Briscese, Guglielmo; Feltovich, Nick; Slonim, Robert L.
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Sydney; Monash University
摘要：Firms can donate a share of profits to charity as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Recent experiments have found that such initiatives can induce higher effort by workers, generating benefits for both sides of the labour market. We design a novel version of the gift-exchange game to account for self-selection, and find that wages remain the most effective incentive to attract and motivate workers, with corporate donations playing a smaller role than previously suggested. We als...
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作者：Laica, Christoph; Lauber, Arne; Sahm, Marco
作者单位：Otto Friedrich University Bamberg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：We examine the fairness and intensity of sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes and heterogeneous players. A tournament is called fair if the winning probabilities in each match depend only on the players' characteristics but not on the sequence of matches. We show that tournaments with three players will be fair if and only if the second prize is valued half of the first prize. The optimal prize structure may, however, be subject to a trade-off between fairness and intensity ...
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作者：Hedegaard, Morten; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Mueller, Daniel; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Innsbruck; University of Munich; University of Vienna
摘要：We use a large and heterogeneous sample of the Danish population to investigate the importance of distributional preferences for behavior in a trust game and a public good game. We find robust evidence for the significant explanatory power of distributional preferences. In fact, compared to twenty-one covariates, distributional preferences turn out to be the single most important predictor of behavior. Specifically, subjects who reveal benevolence in the domain of advantageous inequality are m...
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作者：Schneider, Mark; Stephenson, Daniel Graydon
摘要：We experimentally investigate bargains, price signaling, and efficiency in markets with asymmetric information where some buyers are informed and some sellers are informed. We show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria where transactions occur under known gains from trade fall into one of two categories. In some cases, uninformed sellers charge high prices but uninformed buyers are only willing to pay low prices. Otherwise, uninformed sellers charge low prices and uninformed buyers are willing ...
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作者：Tsakas, Nikolas; Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：When a majority of voters has common values, but private information, then the runoff rule always admits an equilibrium that aggregates information strictly better than any equilibrium of the plurality rule. But there are cases in which the plurality rule supports equilibria that aggregate information strictly better compared to certain undominated equilibria of the runoff rule. Is there any risk with applying the runoff rule in these situations? We conduct a laboratory experiment and we show ...
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作者：Cheikbossian, Guillaume
作者单位：INRAE; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Montpellier; Institut Agro; Montpellier SupAgro
摘要：We provide an evolutionary explanation for the well-established evidence of the existence of in-group favoritism in intergroup conflict. Using a model of group contest for a (local) public good, we show that the larger the number of groups competing against one another, or the larger the degree of complementarity between individual efforts, the more likely are group members altruistic towards their teammates under preference evolution. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We generalize the famous Tarski result by showing that: if Xis a complete lattice, and f: X -> X is an increasing and continuous mapping, then for all points x(0) is an element of X, the limits of sequences (f(n)(lim sup(k) f(k)(x(0))))(n=1)(infinity) and (f(n)(lim inf(k) f(k)(x(0))))(n=1)(infinity) are fixed points of f. These limits are the tight fixed-point bounds between which sufficiently large iterations f(k)(x(0)) are located. We provide an application of this result to studying best-re...
