Elections under biased candidate endorsements - an experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sun, Junze; Schram, Arthur; Sloof, Randolph
• 署名单位: European University Institute; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.004
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 141-158
• 关键词: Biased endorsements; voting; turnout; Quantal response equilibrium; experiments

摘要

We construct an election game to study the electoral impacts of biased candidate endorsements. We derive a set of testable predictions. We test these in a laboratory experiment and find that observed election outcomes and vote shares are well predicted. We find no support, however, for our prediction that the relationship between election outcome and the endorser's bias is non-monotonic; i.e., ex ante, a candidate's winning probability will first increase and then decrease as the endorser becomes more biased towards her. Voter turnout is much less responsive to the bias than predicted. We argue that observed voting behavior can be explained, to a substantial extent, by three behavioral mechanisms: (a) distinct levels of rationality for candidate choice and turnout decisions, (b) conservative belief updating, and (c) 'partial competition neglect', where voters underestimate the correlation between the information released by an endorsement and the closeness of elections. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.