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作者：Gentry, Matthew; Pesendorfer, Martin
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：A single-product retailer faces bargain hunting consumers whose willingness to pay incorporates sensations of gain and loss driven by differences between the observed price and prices they rationally expect in the spirit of Koszegi and Rabin (2006). We examine the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (non-commitment) pricing solution in which (i) the retailer maximizes profit given consumers' beliefs and (ii) consumers' beliefs are consistent with the retailer's choice. We show two novel results: First, ...
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作者：Michel, Christian; Stenzel, Andre
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper studies the ex-ante prediction and ex-post evaluation of the effects of cooling off policies when consumers may exhibit a projection bias. We set up a theoretical model in which a firm optimally reacts to consumers' preferences and the regulatory framework and show that neither the adoption of a mandatory cooling-off period nor a return policy is generically superior or consumer welfare improving. We then analyze how market level data can help to evaluate the policies ex post using ...
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作者：Yan, Haomin
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This paper studies the design of position auctions when bidders have multi-unit demands for advertising positions. I propose an ascending clock auction with two stages: allocation stage and assignment stage. The allocation stage determines the quantity of positions assigned to each advertiser using a generalized version of the Ausubel (2004) auction under the context of differentiated items. The assignment stage determines the ranking of advertisements using a generalized version of the genera...
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作者：Wong, Tsz-Ning; Yang, Lily Ling
作者单位：University of Basel; University of Mannheim
摘要：We consider a model of dynamic expertise, in which two experts with the same bias exert efforts over time to discover the state of the world and are able to send verifiable messages about the discovery to a decision maker. We show that dynamic revelation of information causes the experts' incentives to acquire information to evolve over time. This leads to novel collaboration dynamics and, in particular, the introduction of another expert can have a motivating effect on the existing expert in ...
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作者：Mensch, Jeffrey
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We explore Bayesian persuasion environments in which the state and action spaces are ordered, allowing for complementarity between actions and types. Building on the literature on monotone comparative statics, we identify conditions that guarantee that these are optimal among all (possibly non-monotone) signal structures. When the action space is binary, supermodularity of the sender's and receiver's preferences suffices for the optimal signal to have a monotone structure. With a continuum of ...
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作者：Dariel, Aurelie; Riedl, Arno; Siegenthaler, Simon
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Maastricht University; Maastricht University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：The widespread use of employee referrals raises questions regarding how they affect labor market outcomes. Does referral hiring lead to a more efficient allocation of workers compared to when hiring is possible only on a competitive market? To utilize the social links of their employees, are employers willing to pay a wage premium? We develop a model and provide results from a laboratory experiment to address these questions. We find that employers often hire via referrals, which in turn mitig...
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作者：Sheth, Jesal D.
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead firms (senders) to disclose information through a process of unravelling. This prediction requires that consumers (receivers) hold correct beliefs and, in equilibrium, make adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous research finds that receivers are naive and do not sufficiently infer non-disclosure as bad news, leading to the failure of complete unravelling. This paper experimentally examines wh...
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作者：Denter, Philipp
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：I study a model of electoral competition where two parties that care about both the spoils of office and policy compete by announcing policy platforms. Parties are characterized by their valence on the one hand and by their policy platforms on the other. Unlike in the extant literature, I assume that valence and policy are complements (instead of substitutes) from the voter's perspective. I generally characterize electoral equilibrium and show that in such a framework increasing one or both pa...
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作者：Kassis, Mark; Schmidt, Sascha L.; Schreyer, Dominik; Sutter, Matthias
作者单位：WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; Max Planck Society; University of Cologne; University of Innsbruck
摘要：In this paper, we show that the right to determine the sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament improves the chances of winning the contest. Because studying dynamic team tournaments - like R&D races - with interim feedback is difficult with company data, we examine decisions of highly paid professionals in soccer penalty shootouts and show that teams whose captains can decide about the shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout. So, managerial decisions matter for outcomes of...
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Wang, Xiruo; Wu, Zenan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Beijing Jiaotong University; Peking University
摘要：This paper studies a multi-prize imperfectly discriminatory contest with symmetric risk-averse contestants. Adopting a multi-winner nested Tullock contest model, we first establish the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium under plausible conditions. We then investigate the optimal prize allocation in the contest. Our analysis provides a formal account of the incentive effects triggered by a variation in the prevailing prize structure when contestants are risk avers...
