Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bando, Keisuke; Kawasaki, Ryo
• 署名单位: Keio University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.013
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 533-553
• 关键词: Multi-period matching; matching with contracts; Temporal stability; Ordered substitutability

摘要

We analyze a multi-period matching market where matching between agents is decided for each time period. To analyze this situation, we embed the situation into the framework of many- to-many matching with contracts where the contract includes the time period at which the matching occurs. While a general stability concept is already defined for the matching with contracts framework, in a multi-period matching model, a stable outcome may not exist when contracts exhibit complementarities across time periods. Thus, we define a weaker stability concept called temporal stability by taking into account the dynamic nature of the model. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a temporally stable outcome, including a corresponding substitutability condition, ordered substitutability, for the multi-period matching model.