Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shorrer, Ran I.; Sovago, Sandor
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Groningen
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.002
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 167-182
• 关键词: college admissions; dominated strategies; market design; Preference misrepresentation; school choice

摘要

College applicants often make dominated choices even when a strategically simple mechanism such as deferred acceptance is in place. We study Hungarian college admissions, where deferred acceptance is used, and still many college applicants make revealed dominated choices: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies, we show that when admission with a tuition waiver becomes more selective, applicants make more revealed dominated choices. Our results suggest that dominated choices respond to economic incentives.