The Texas Shoot-Out under Knightian uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bauch, Gerrit; Riedel, Frank
• 署名单位: University of Bielefeld; University of Johannesburg
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.009
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 35-50
• 关键词: Knightian uncertainty in games; Texas Shoot-Out; Partnership dissolution

摘要

We investigate a widely used mechanism to resolve disputes among business partners, known as Texas Shoot -Out, under Knightian uncertainty. For a non -degenerate range of intermediate valuations, an ambiguity -averse divider truthfully reveals their valuation in equilibrium. As a consequence, the resulting outcome is efficient, in contrast to the Bayesian case. With equal shares, both agents prefer ex -ante to be the chooser and would like to avoid triggering the mechanism in the first place.