Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Arieli, Itai; Arigapudi, Srinivas
署名单位：
Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.009
发表日期：
2024
页码：
377-387
关键词：
摘要：
This paper investigates the dynamics of product adoption under incomplete information regarding the product quality. A new agent observes a small sample of product choices within the population and receives a noisy private signal regarding the realized state of the world. Using simple heuristics, the agent estimates both the product quality and the distribution of product choices in the population. The agent then chooses a product that is a best response to this estimate. We show that fast adoption of the optimal product in the population occurs if and only if the strength of the private signal exceeds a certain threshold.