Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rohde, Linnea Marie
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.005
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 305-337
• 关键词: Costly voting; Costly information acquisition; Mandatory voting; Compulsory voting

摘要

An election with full turnout is supposed to achieve an outcome that perfectly reflects the majority's preference. This result requires voters to be perfectly informed about their preferences and to vote accordingly. I show that incentivizing participation with an abstention fine does not necessarily incentivize information acquisition. While a small abstention fine always increases information acquisition compared to Voluntary Voting, a high abstention fine that achieves full turnout increases information acquisition only if voting costs are high. If voting costs are low, the opposite is true: Less individuals acquire information under Compulsory Voting with full turnout than under Voluntary Voting.