Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heller, Yuval; Kuzmics, Christoph
• 署名单位: Bar Ilan University; University of Graz
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.003
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 51-76
• 关键词: Secret handshake; Evolutionary robustness; cheap talk; Communication-proofness; renegotiation-proofness; incomplete information

摘要

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the coordinated outcomes. The set of communication-proof equilibria is a small and relatively homogeneous subset of the set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate, play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, such equilibria are robust to changes in players' beliefs and interim Pareto efficient.