Non-isolation, reversals, and social preference

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cheung, Paul H. Y.; Ellis, Keaton
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Monash University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.016
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 159-174
• 关键词: Non-isolation; Social preference; Payment mechanism; Experimental methodology; Decisions under risk

摘要

Recent evidence suggests that non-isolation behavior could significantly impact laboratory experiments using the random problem selection (RPS) payment mechanism through lottery integration. Theoretical work also highlights social preferences that can violate statewise monotonicity, a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility with the RPS payment mechanism in case of lottery integration. Additionally, non-isolation can influence decisions through non-consequential dynamic concerns. In a series of three simple and parsimonious experiments and three tests, we examine the occurrence of the two kinds of non-isolation and reversal behaviors. We find significant evidence for positive reversal behavior, where subjects are more likely to make a fair choice if there is an alternative possible realization of an unfair outcome (which they chose themselves). In addition, the lower bounds for the prevalence of non-isolation in terms of lottery integration and dynamic non-consequential concern are estimated to be approximately 10% and 20%, respectively.