The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Myatt, David P.
署名单位：
University of London; London Business School
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.001
发表日期：
2025
页码：
260-277
关键词：
摘要：
In a war of attrition a player's perceived strength is the distribution describing beliefs about her valuation. Small asymmetries in strength have a large effect: in the unique equilibrium of a game with a deadline the war ends quickly (instantly, as the deadline becomes infinite) with a concession by the (perceived) weaker player. The ranking of strength compares hazard rates in the upper tails of the distributions of beliefs; greater uncertainty about a player tends to give her more strength. The results also hold if techniques other than a deadline are used to obtain a unique equilibrium.