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作者：Li, Yue
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：This article develops a heterogeneous agents model to analyze the effects of Social Security survivors insurance. The model features a negative mortality-income gradient, asymmetric information of individual mortality rates, and a warm-glow bequest motive that varies by age and family structure. The model matches life-cycle changes in life insurance coverage and generates advantageous selection in the insurance market. For male agents, reducing survivors benefits for dependent children generat...
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作者：Chiu, Jonathan; Dong, Mei; Shao, Enchuan
作者单位：Bank of Canada; Victoria University Wellington; University of Melbourne; University of Saskatchewan
摘要：This article studies the welfare effects of credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, credit arrangements can be welfare reducing, because high consumption by credit users drives up the price level, reducing consumption by money users who are subject to a binding liquidity constraint. By adopting an optimal trading mechanism, however, these welfare implications can be overturned. Both price discrimination and nonlinear pri...
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作者：Piyapromdee, Suphanit
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：This article extends a classic on-the-job search model of homogeneous workers and firms by introducing a shirking problem. Workers choose their effort levels and search on the job. Firms elicit effort through wages and monitoring; an inverse relationship between wages and monitoring rates is derived. Wages play a dual role by allocating labor supply and motivating employee effort. This gives rise to an equilibrium wage distribution that contrasts with existing literature. In particular, I show...
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作者：Harless, Patrick; Manjunath, Vikram
作者单位：University of Glasgow; University of Ottawa
摘要：Individuals form preferences through search, interviews, discussion, and investigation. In a stylized object allocation model, we characterize the equilibrium learning strategies induced by different allocation rules and trace their welfare consequences. Our analysis reveals that top trading cycles rules dominate serial priority rules under inequality-averse measures of social welfare.
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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Pan, Shiyuan; Zhang, Tianle
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Zhejiang University; Lingnan University
摘要：We present a model where firms conduct R&D in both a safe and a risky direction. As patentability standards rise, an innovation in the risky direction is less likely to receive a patent, which decreases the static incentive for new entrants to conduct risky R&D but can increase their dynamic incentive. These, together with a strategic substitution and a market structure effect, result in an inverted-U shape in the risky direction but a U shape in the safe direction for the relationship between...
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作者：Kadam, Sangram V.; Kotowski, Maciej H.
作者单位：Charles River Associates; Harvard University
摘要：We examine a dynamic, two-sided, one-to-one matching market where agents on both sides interact over a period of time. We define and identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching, which may require revisions to initial assignments. A generalization of the deferred acceptance algorithm can identify dynamically stable outcomes in a large class of economies, including cases with intertemporal preference complementarities. We relate our analysis to market unrave...
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作者：Decarolis, Francesco
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：This article contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex post screening of bid responsiveness and average bid auctions (ABAs), in which the bidder closest to the average bid wins. The equilibrium analysis reveals that their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the ABA is typically less efficient. Using a data set of Italian public procurement auctions run alternately under the two formats, a structural model of bidding is estimated for...
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作者：Eichberger, Juergen; Guerdjikova, Ani
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA)
摘要：We study how ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes affect asset prices when consumers form their expectations based on past observations. In an overlapping generations economy with risk-neutral yet ambiguity-sensitive consumers, we describe limiting asset prices depending on the proportion of investor types. We then study the evolution of consumer-type shares. With long memory, the market does not select for ambiguity neutrality. Whenever perceived ambiguity is sufficiently small, but positive, on...
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作者：Frenkel, Sivan; Heller, Yuval; Teper, Roee
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Bar Ilan University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation. We suggest that the endowment effect and the winner's curse could have jointly survived natural selection together. We develop a new family of hybrid-replicator dynamics. Under such dynamics, biases survive in the population for a long period of time even if they only partially compensate for each other and despite the fact th...
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作者：Hummel, Patrick; McAfee, R. Preston
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Microsoft
摘要：We address the question of how a monopolist should price when facing evolutionary consumers who gradually move in the direction of following their optimal strategy but may make temporary suboptimal choices. We show that under a broad generalization of the most commonly used model of evolution, the monopolist will set a path of prices such that all consumers eventually stop purchasing the monopolist's product.
