COMPARING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Decarolis, Francesco
• 署名单位: Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12274
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 391-419
• 关键词: 1st-price auctions; unobserved heterogeneity; nonparametric deconvolution; entry; MODEL; bids; CONTRACTS; identification; strategy; prices

摘要

This article contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex post screening of bid responsiveness and average bid auctions (ABAs), in which the bidder closest to the average bid wins. The equilibrium analysis reveals that their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the ABA is typically less efficient. Using a data set of Italian public procurement auctions run alternately under the two formats, a structural model of bidding is estimated for the subsample of first price auctions and used to quantify the efficiency loss under counterfactual ABAs.