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作者：Gawn, Glynis; Innes, Robert
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Merced
摘要：Does honesty promote trust and trustworthiness? We investigate how being lied to (versus told the truth) in a Gneezy deception game affects behavior in a subsequent trust game with different players. Using a design that controls for potential treatment effects on payoffs, mood, and beliefs about the overall propensity for honesty in the experiment, we find that the specific experience of being lied to significantly erodes trust and trustworthiness.
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作者：Xu, Haiqing
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This article studies estimation of social interactions in a large network game, where all observations come from one single equilibrium of a network game with asymmetric information. Simple assumptions about the structure are made to establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. I show that the equilibrium strategies satisfy a network decaying dependence condition requiring that dependence between two players' decisions decay with their network distance, which serves as the basis ...
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作者：Baillon, Aurelien; Emirmahmutoglu, Aysil
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：Empirical studies of ambiguity attitudes to date have focused on events of moderate likelihood. Extrapolation to rare events requires caution. In an Ellsberg-like experiment with very unlikely events, we measured ambiguity attitudes with neither assumptions on subjects' beliefs nor restrictions to specific ambiguity models. Very unlikely events were overweighted, being weighted more strongly in isolation than when part of larger events. Using latent profile analysis, we classified the subjects...
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作者：Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kesten, Onur
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：A particular adaptation of Gale's top trading cycles (TTC) procedure applied to school choice, the so-called TTC mechanism, has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features. We discuss and introduce alternative adaptations of Gale's original procedure that can offer improvements over TTC in terms of equity, along with various other distributional considerations. Instead of giving all the trading power to those students with the high...
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作者：Polanski, Arnold; Vega-Redondo, Fernando
作者单位：University of East Anglia; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We consider an intertemporal framework where different coalitions interact repeatedly over time. Both the terms of trade and the endogenous cooperation structure are characterized, in a protocol-free manner, when: A coalition is formed with positive probability if, and only if, the shares obtained by its members weakly exceed their respective share expectations. Each matched coalition distributes the entire surplus among its members. Members of any coalition are treated symmetrically with resp...
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作者：Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I.; Rutstrom, E. Elisabet
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Cape Town; Durham University; Orebro University; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：Convenient assumptions about qualitative properties of the intertemporal utility function have generated counterintuitive implications for the relationship between atemporal risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If the intertemporal utility function is additively separable, then the latter two concepts are the inverse of each other. We review a theoretical specification with a long lineage in the literature on multi-attribute utility and use this theoretical structure...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko
作者单位：Michigan State University; Yonsei University; University of Queensland
摘要：This article develops a model of patent trolls to understand various litigation strategies employed by nonpracticing entities (NPEs). When an NPE faces multiple potential infringers who use related technologies, it can gain a credible threat to litigate even when it has no such credibility vis-a-vis any single potential infringer in isolation. This is due to an information externality generated by an early litigation outcome for subsequent litigation. Successful litigation creates an option va...
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作者：Cho, In-Koo; Matsui, Akihiko
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Hanyang University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of Tokyo
摘要：We examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing. A seller, who has private information about product quality, and a buyer are matched to bargain over price. They form a long-term relationship if they reach agreement. They return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved. The market fails to clear if and only if the r...
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作者：Darden, Michael; Gilleskie, Donna B.; Strumpf, Koleman
作者单位：George Washington University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Wake Forest University
摘要：Many public health policies are rooted in findings from medical and epidemiological studies that fail to consider behavioral influences. Using nearly 50 years of data from the Framingham Heart Study's male participants, we evaluate the longevity consequences of different lifetime smoking patterns by jointly estimating smoking behavior and health outcomes over the life cycle, by richly including smoking and health histories, and by flexibly incorporating correlated unobserved heterogeneity. Unc...
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作者：Koh, Yumi
作者单位：Singapore Management University
摘要：Although legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game-theoretic model where members strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with noncooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. To quantify the effects of political power on the agreed-upon allocation, I structurally estimate the model using the Bridge...
