MULTIPERIOD MATCHING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kadam, Sangram V.; Kotowski, Maciej H.
• 署名单位: Charles River Associates; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12324
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1927-1947
• 关键词: coalition-formation; college admissions; bargaining set; STABILITY; MARKET; core; marriage; machiavelli; CONTRACTS; ECONOMICS

摘要

We examine a dynamic, two-sided, one-to-one matching market where agents on both sides interact over a period of time. We define and identify sufficient conditions for the existence of a dynamically stable matching, which may require revisions to initial assignments. A generalization of the deferred acceptance algorithm can identify dynamically stable outcomes in a large class of economies, including cases with intertemporal preference complementarities. We relate our analysis to market unraveling and to common market design applications, including the medical residency match.