RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION WITH EFFICIENCY WAGES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Piyapromdee, Suphanit
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12305
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1315-1343
• 关键词: equilibrium unemployment; employer-size; MODEL; search; supervision; earnings; WORKER

摘要

This article extends a classic on-the-job search model of homogeneous workers and firms by introducing a shirking problem. Workers choose their effort levels and search on the job. Firms elicit effort through wages and monitoring; an inverse relationship between wages and monitoring rates is derived. Wages play a dual role by allocating labor supply and motivating employee effort. This gives rise to an equilibrium wage distribution that contrasts with existing literature. In particular, I show that a hump-shaped and positively skewed wage distribution, as observed empirically, can be derived even when firms and workers are, respectively, identical.