LEARNING MATTERS: REAPPRAISING OBJECT ALLOCATION RULES WHEN AGENTS STRATEGICALLY INVESTIGATE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harless, Patrick; Manjunath, Vikram
• 署名单位: University of Glasgow; University of Ottawa
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12280
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 557-592
• 关键词: Serial dictatorship; assignment; exchange; core; INFORMATION; INEQUALITY; MARKET

摘要

Individuals form preferences through search, interviews, discussion, and investigation. In a stylized object allocation model, we characterize the equilibrium learning strategies induced by different allocation rules and trace their welfare consequences. Our analysis reveals that top trading cycles rules dominate serial priority rules under inequality-averse measures of social welfare.