EVOLUTIONARY CONSUMERS IMPLY MONOPOLIES EXIT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hummel, Patrick; McAfee, R. Preston
• 署名单位: Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Microsoft
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12318
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1733-1746
• 关键词: stochastic replicator dynamics; lotka-volterra equation; public-goods games; stable strategies; viscous demand; selection; equilibrium; STABILITY; CLASSIFICATION; population

摘要

We address the question of how a monopolist should price when facing evolutionary consumers who gradually move in the direction of following their optimal strategy but may make temporary suboptimal choices. We show that under a broad generalization of the most commonly used model of evolution, the monopolist will set a path of prices such that all consumers eventually stop purchasing the monopolist's product.