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作者：GLOVER, J
摘要：This note considers a principal-multi-agent model of a firm subject to adverse selection. With just the usual optimal (incentive-constrained) contracts being offered, there exist multiple (Bayes-Nash) equilibria in the agents' subgame. Moreover, from the agents' perspective, there exists an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the equilibrium desired by the principal. By exploiting the structure of the model, this note develops a new approach for eliminating unwanted equilibria (while retaining t...
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作者：CAMPBELL, DE; NAGAHISA, RI
作者单位：Kansai University
摘要：A social welfare function f maps the family of profiles of economic preferences into the set of continuous and quasitransitive relations on the space of allocations of public and/or private goods. If f satisfies Arrow's independence axiom and an extremely mild responsiveness condition, then f must be oligarchical. However, Pareto aggregation is the only oligarchical rule that does not completely exclude someone from consideration or invert someone's preference ordering before incorporating it ...
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作者：MOULIN, H; SHENKER, S
作者单位：Xerox
摘要：A finite group of agents share a (one output) production function. A cost sharing rule allocates the total cost among the users for every conceivable profile of output demands. We investigate the space of possible cost sharing rules from an axiomatic perspective. We provide two characterizations of average cost pricing, one based on the axioms of Additivity and Monotonicity (both with respect to the cost function), and the other based on the axioms of Additivity and a version of Consistency. W...
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作者：ELMES, S; RENY, PJ
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：It is argued that of Thompson's four elementary transformations, one (inflate-deflate) does not leave the strategic features of a game unchanged. It is shown, however, that two of the remaining transformations together with a modification of the third suffice for the purpose of reducing any finite extensive form game having perfect recall to its reduced (normal) form. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：HILLAS, J
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：A stable set of beliefs is defined to be a subset of the set of sequential equilibria such that for any equilibrium in the subset the beliefs and/or actions at any information set should be consistent with the equilibria in the subset that reach that information set. Further, any sequential equilibrium that is not in the subset disagrees, at some unreached information set, with the equilibria of the subset that do reach that information set. The behavior of this solution is examined in a numbe...
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作者：WRIGHT, R
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：Search models can generate an endogenous role for fiat money, in the sense that there exist equilibria where intrisically useless, unbacked, paper currency is valed due to its function as a medium of exchange. In this note, I ask if there exist sunspot equilibria in these models, where the value or acceptability of money fluctuates along with extrinsic random events even though the fundamentals of the economy are deterministic and time invariant. The answer is yes.
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作者：KRANICH, L
摘要：Goldman (Gift equilibria and Pareto optimality, J. Econ. Theory 18, 1978, 368-370) demonstrated that the Second Welfare Theorem generally fails to hold in economies in which benevolent agents are permitted to make gifts. In this brief note, we point out that for the class of economies considered by Goldman, symmetry and a slight bias in favor of one's own consumption restore the Second Welfare Theorem.
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作者：WINTER, E
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The joint production of a single output from a single input by a group of potential users of a technology is usually analyzed in the literature using a ''cooperative'' approach. We provide an analysis for such economies by means of non-cooperative bargaining. Two bargaining models are analyzed, one based on demands the other on proposals. We show that the convexity of the production function implies that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these bargaining games are coalition stable, (i.e....
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作者：BENHABIB, J; RUSTICHINI, A
摘要：The papers in this symposium demonstrate the theoretical as well as the empirical plausibility of indeterminacy and of sunspots in equilibrium models with infinitely lived agents. They depart from the standard competitive framework because of the presence of externalities or of monopolistic competition. Some focus on business fluctuations while others address long-run growth. The second part of the Introduction presents a general unifying framework to identify the structure that is common to t...
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作者：JACKSON, MO
摘要：The existence of ''speculative'' equilibria is proven in a simple overlapping generations, infinite horizon economy. In equilibrium, all agents bid for assets according to increasing functions of private information which is independent of the fundamental value (dividend stream) of the asset. This is a unique best response to the strategies of the other agents, which implies that speculative information is valuable. For certain stationary settings, the existence of speculative equilibria in wh...
