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作者：BENHABIB, J; FARMER, REA
摘要：We investigate properties of the one-sector growth model with increasing returns under two organizational structures capable of reconciling the existence of aggregate increasing returns with competitive behavior by firms. The first involves input externalities; the second involves monopolistic competition. We show, for parameters in close accord with recent literature on real business cycles, that the model displays an indeterminate steady state that can be exploited to generate a model of bus...
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作者：FARMER, REA; GUO, JT
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We calibrate a quantitative equilibrium macroeconomic model with an aggregate technology that is subject to increasing returns and show that this model may display fluctuations at business cycle frequencies even when there are no shocks to the fundamentals of the economy. These fluctuations are due to the self-fulfilling beliefs of investors which we call ''animal spirits.'' We compare the impulse response functions predicted by our model and by two other more standard models with a four-varia...
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作者：MCAFEE, RP
摘要：In a generalization of the Butters advertising model, the equilibrium involves one firm that advertises at least twice as much as the others, who all advertise equally. A cartel formation game is considered, and any equilibrium cartel involves at least two, but generally not all, firms. In one equilibrium, only the largest firms join the cartel. A merger game is considered. and, in equilibrium, the large film buys the other films in sequence, with discounting equalizing the expected utility of...
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作者：PETERS, M
摘要：In a non-stationary matching problem sellers can compete for potential trading partners by making ex ante pprice offers publicly before the matching process occurs in each period. This paper introduces the concept of an incentive-consistent matching technology in which buyers have no incentive to modify the allocation generated by the matching technology when there is a price deviation. It is shown that when the matching technology is incentive-consistent all trades must occur at prices close ...
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作者：DUTTA, B; SEN, A
摘要：We demonstrate the existence of a social choice function in an environment where there are two outcomes and two players each of whom can be of two types, which can only be implemented in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium by a mechanism where both players have an infinite number of messages. This stands in dramatic contrast to the case of Nash implementation in complete information, finite environments.
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作者：EVANS, GW; HONKAPOHJA, S
作者单位：University of Helsinki
摘要：We examine local stability under learning of stationary Markov sunspot equilibria (SSEs) in a simple dynamic nonlinear model. Necessary and sufficient conditions for local convergence of a recursive learning algorithm to SSEs are shown to be given (generically) by expectational stability (E-stability) conditions. We distinguish between weak and strong E-stability, where the latter requires stability also with respect to overparametrizations of the sunspot solution. Economic applications are gi...
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作者：CONLEY, JP
摘要：It is shown if all consumers are either asymptotically satiated or strictly nonsatiated in public goods, then the core converges to the Lindahl allocations as the economy grow without bound. Asymptotic satiation implies that only a vanishing fraction of the private good is devoted to public goods production as the economy gets large. Strict nonsatiation, on the other hand, implies that essentially all of the private good is devoted to public goods production in the limit. It is interesting tha...
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作者：BORGERS, T
摘要：Considering finite normal-form games, we assume that players maximise expected utility, that they hold beliefs with full support, and that these facts are ''approximate common knowledge'' among players. We show that players satisfy these assumptions if and only if they choose strategies that survive the following procedure: first, all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated, and then strongly dominated strategies are iteratively eliminated. This procedure is due to E. Dekel and D. Fudenberg...
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作者：BERKOWITZ, D
摘要：For general restrictions on the discount rate and factor intensities Benhabib and Nishimura [J. Econ. Theory 35 (1985), 284-306], Boldrin [Paths of optimal accumulation in two-sector models, in ''Economic Complexity: Chaos, Sunspots, Bubbles and Nonlinearity'' (W. Barnett, J. Geweke, and K. Shell, Eds.), 231-252, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge], and Boldrin and Deneckere [J. Econ. Dynam. Control 14 (1990), 627-653] generate pareto-efficient cycles in two-sector models of competitive economie...
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作者：ABREU, D; MATSUSHIMA, H
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：We study implementation of social choice functions when the planner can randomize and impose arbitrarily small fines on players. In complete information environments with three or more players, it is shown that any social choice function is exactly implementable in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. The mechanisms used are finite and robust to the order of removal of dominated strategies.
