A PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF SPECULATIVE EQUILIBRIA
成果类型：
Note
署名作者：
JACKSON, MO
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1063
发表日期：
1994
页码：
221-233
关键词：
摘要：
The existence of ''speculative'' equilibria is proven in a simple overlapping generations, infinite horizon economy. In equilibrium, all agents bid for assets according to increasing functions of private information which is independent of the fundamental value (dividend stream) of the asset. This is a unique best response to the strategies of the other agents, which implies that speculative information is valuable. For certain stationary settings, the existence of speculative equilibria in which all agents use the same bidding function is demonstrated.