A FOUNDATION FOR PARETO-AGGREGATION
成果类型：
Note
署名作者：
CAMPBELL, DE; NAGAHISA, RI
署名单位：
Kansai University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1068
发表日期：
1994
页码：
277-285
关键词：
摘要：
A social welfare function f maps the family of profiles of economic preferences into the set of continuous and quasitransitive relations on the space of allocations of public and/or private goods. If f satisfies Arrow's independence axiom and an extremely mild responsiveness condition, then f must be oligarchical. However, Pareto aggregation is the only oligarchical rule that does not completely exclude someone from consideration or invert someone's preference ordering before incorporating it into the group preference.