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作者：BENHABIB, J; PERLI, R
摘要：In this paper we study the dynamics of endogenous growth, both in the model of Lucas and in a generalization that incorporates a labor-leisure choice. We characterize the regions of the parameter space that give rise to unique equilibria as well as the regions that yield a continuum of equilibria with positive growth rates. We find that such multiple equilibria exist for empirically very plausible parameters, in particular when the Lucas model is modified to incorporate endogenous labor. Journ...
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作者：GALI, J
摘要：We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistically competitive firms and endogenous markups and show the possibility of equilibria with persistent fluctuations driven by self-fulfilling revisions of expectations. For some parameter values such fluctuations are characterized by time series properties similar to those observed in U.S. postwar business cycles. In contrast with the existing literature our results do not rely on the presence of increasing returns or nominal rigidi...
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作者：CHAE, S; YANG, JA
摘要：We propose an n-person pure bargaining game which generalizes Rubinstein's two-person bargaining game, and show that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium outcome. The solution approaches the n-person Nash solution, as defined by Chae [''The n-person Nash bargaining solution with time preference,'' Econ. Lett. 41 (1993), 21-24] in the time preference framework, as the time lapse between bargaining rounds goes to 0. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：GOTTARDI, P
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：In this paper we show that if markets are incomplete and there are nominal assets, whose payoff is denominated in money, monetary policy will be in general non-neutral. The mechanism through which monetary policy operates is a change in the structure of the rates of return: by changing the level of money prices monetary policy affects the payoffs of nominal assets. This differs from previous arguments for non-neutrality. We also show that a consideration of this effect of monetary policy may a...
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作者：PERRY, M
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作者：SAMUELSON, L
摘要：We investigate an evolutionary process that is continually perturbed by ''mutations.'' If the support of the (unique) stochastically stable distribution is a singleton, then it must be a Nash equilibrium. If one element of a ''mutation-connected component'' of Nash equilibria appears in the stochastically stable distribution, then all members of that component appear. This implies that the stochastically stable distribution will include weakly dominated strategies in many cases, and in some ca...
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作者：LUENBERGER, DG
摘要：Consider an economy with d commodities and n individuals. A pair (p, M), where p is a price vector and M = (m1, m2, ..., m(n)) is a set of n individual income levels, defines a set of individual budget constraints. It is known that such pairs provide a framework for duality-based investigations of Pareto efficient allocations and of equilibria. This paper employs this framework in a general setting, not requiring smoothness or boundedness of budget sets, to develop duals of the first and secon...
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作者：NEILSON, WS
摘要：Expected utility maximizers bid according to dominant strategies in second price auctions for risky prizes, bids are independent of the number of other bidders or the reserve price. the optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders, and ascending bid and second price auctions generate the same expected revenue. If expected utility fails, none of these results remain true, and symmetric equilibria may not be unique. If fanning in and betweenness hold, uniquenes is restored, bids...
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作者：STAHL, DO
摘要：N sellers advertise a homogeneous good to M buyers whose only source of information is this advertising. There is a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which sellers choose a common advertising level and mix over prices. This NE approaches marginal cost priing as advertising costs decrease, and approaches monopoly pricing as advertising costs increase. More sellers induce lower prices and less advertising per seller; however, the social welfare effect can be negative for some advertising technolog...
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作者：TIAN, GQ; LI, Q
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：In this paper, we formalize an implementable state-ownership institutional framework for public goods economies by using the Generalized Ratio equilibrium that yields Pareto-efficient and individually rational allocations and that allows for general variable returns. We then address the problems created by manipulative behavior on the part of individuals and study the implementability of this social choice rule by giving an incentive compatible and well-behaved mechanism whose Nash allocations...
