ON THE STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE OF EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
ELMES, S; RENY, PJ
署名单位：
Western University (University of Western Ontario)
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1001
发表日期：
1994
页码：
1-23
关键词：
摘要：
It is argued that of Thompson's four elementary transformations, one (inflate-deflate) does not leave the strategic features of a game unchanged. It is shown, however, that two of the remaining transformations together with a modification of the third suffice for the purpose of reducing any finite extensive form game having perfect recall to its reduced (normal) form. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.