NONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING IN NATURAL MONOPOLIES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
WINTER, E
署名单位：
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1062
发表日期：
1994
页码：
202-220
关键词：
摘要：
The joint production of a single output from a single input by a group of potential users of a technology is usually analyzed in the literature using a ''cooperative'' approach. We provide an analysis for such economies by means of non-cooperative bargaining. Two bargaining models are analyzed, one based on demands the other on proposals. We show that the convexity of the production function implies that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these bargaining games are coalition stable, (i.e., core outcomes). In the case of the proposal model, the equilibrium outcomes yield even a full characterization of the core.