STOCHASTIC STABILITY IN GAMES WITH ALTERNATIVE BEST REPLIES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
SAMUELSON, L
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1053
发表日期：
1994
页码：
35-65
关键词：
摘要：
We investigate an evolutionary process that is continually perturbed by ''mutations.'' If the support of the (unique) stochastically stable distribution is a singleton, then it must be a Nash equilibrium. If one element of a ''mutation-connected component'' of Nash equilibria appears in the stochastically stable distribution, then all members of that component appear. This implies that the stochastically stable distribution will include weakly dominated strategies in many cases, and in some cases the outcome may include only weakly dominated strategies. Choice trembles can eliminate weakly dominated strategies if but only if they occur with arbitrarily higher probability than that of mutations.
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