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作者：BLUME, A
摘要：This paper examines the effectiveness of perturbation refinements in sender-receiver games. It is shown that babbling equilibria are always perfect and even proper. However, they need not be strategically stable. An example is given where the only strategically stable pooling equilibria are pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore, there exist examples in which none of the pooling equilibria is strategically stable. Persistence is effective in games with small message spaces. It rules out pooling...
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作者：KAJII, A
摘要：We study the optimality, or efficiency, of competitive equilibria in a standard two period economy where markets are incomplete. Statistical information about consumers' preferences and endowments is known to a social planner, but the planner cannot observe consumers' types directly. A competitive equilibrium is anonymous constrained optimal if the social planner cannot Pareto improve upon the equilibrium allocation by intervening in asset markets with any asset trade rule satisfying anonymity...
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作者：KLEINDORFER, PR; SERTEL, MR
作者单位：Bogazici University
摘要：A ''community'' of n agents must determine which of its members should provide an indivisible public good. Each of the agents can provide the public good, but the provision cost varies among the agents. We identify here an efficient solution concept for such problems and design a class of auction-like mechanisms, each of which Nash implements (and under appropriate domain restrictions fully Nash implements) this. The mechanisms are in the spirit of ''kth lowest bidder'' auctions.
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作者：LAMBSON, VE
摘要：Optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames exhibit security level punishments for the largest firm. If no firm has sufficient capacity to service the market, then collusion that is barely sustainable by optimal penal codes entails higher capacity utilization by the largest firm than by the other firms. Collusion supported by optimal penal codes in models with a large firm facing a competitive fringe can result in the large firm having low capacity utilization and thus providing a ''...
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作者：SCHMEIDLER, D; TAUMAN, Y
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：This work was motivated by a problem regarding a group of public utilities located in relatively close proximity to each other. Some of these utilities are confronted by a shortage of capacity while others have excess capacity. The buyers cooperate to purchase in the most efficient way the quantities they need (which are private information). The total joint cost is then allocated by an incentive compatible rule (i.e., a rule which induces the buyers to reveal their true demands). We show that...
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作者：KERSCHBAMER, R
摘要：Demski, Sappington, and Spiller [J. Econ. Theory 44 (1988), 156-167] explore the effects of bankruptcy constraints on incentive schemes when two risk-neutral agents operate in correlated environments. For a setting in which the agents receive their private information before contracts are agreed upon they claim that the truthtelling equilibrium induced by a pair of optimal direct schemes is necessarily subgame dominated. The present paper shows how the reward functions in the Demski-Sappington...
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作者：GALI, J
摘要：We study the possibility of random changes in the allocation of resources among regions/sectors in the presence of local productive externalities, in an environment without intrinsic uncertainty. We show that ''positive'' externalities over some range of activity are a necessary condition for existence of such sunspot equilibria. For the two-state sunspot case, we derive sufficient conditions for existence of sunspot equilibria, in terms of the properties of adjustment costs, private technolog...
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作者：XIE, DY
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Special pairs of the utility functions and the production functions are used in this paper to uncover the transitional dynamics in a Lucas model of growth. The main findings are as follows: A continuum of equilibria exists if the external effect of human capital in goods production is sufficiently large. The process of lagging behind, catching up with, and overtaking that we often observe in the world economy can be explained. Finally, some equilibrium paths are shown to have such complicated ...
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作者：DIXIT, A; ROB, R
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Consider a two-sector economy subject to recurring technological shocks. These affect earnings in the two sectors differently, creating incentives for workers to switch occupation. Switching costs arc sunk. Individuals are risk-averse and cannot diversify their income risk. We characterize the rational expectations equilibrium of the economy and illustrate the extent to which uncertainty and switching costs increase labor immobility. The resulting equilibrium is not even second-best optimal. E...
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作者：NAGAHISA, RI
摘要：The purpose of this paper is: (i) to amend a result of Gevers [Walrasian social choice: Some simple axiomatic approaches, in ''Social Choice and Public Decision Making: Essays in Honor of K. J. Arrow'' (Heller et al, Eds.), Vol. 1, Cambridge Univ. Press, London/New York, 1986] on Walrasian social choice, and (ii) to characterize Walrasian allocations in terms of social choice axioms when the number of agents grows infinitely large in Debreu-Scarf's fashion. Based on Debreu-Scarf's core converg...
