AUCTIONING THE PROVISION OF AN INDIVISIBLE PUBLIC GOOD
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
KLEINDORFER, PR; SERTEL, MR
署名单位：
Bogazici University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1052
发表日期：
1994
页码：
20-34
关键词：
摘要：
A ''community'' of n agents must determine which of its members should provide an indivisible public good. Each of the agents can provide the public good, but the provision cost varies among the agents. We identify here an efficient solution concept for such problems and design a class of auction-like mechanisms, each of which Nash implements (and under appropriate domain restrictions fully Nash implements) this. The mechanisms are in the spirit of ''kth lowest bidder'' auctions.