DESTROYING THE PRETENDING EQUILIBRIA IN THE DEMSKI-SAPPINGTON-SPILLER MODEL
成果类型：
Note
署名作者：
KERSCHBAMER, R
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1013
发表日期：
1994
页码：
230-237
关键词：
摘要：
Demski, Sappington, and Spiller [J. Econ. Theory 44 (1988), 156-167] explore the effects of bankruptcy constraints on incentive schemes when two risk-neutral agents operate in correlated environments. For a setting in which the agents receive their private information before contracts are agreed upon they claim that the truthtelling equilibrium induced by a pair of optimal direct schemes is necessarily subgame dominated. The present paper shows how the reward functions in the Demski-Sappington-Spiller revelation schemes can costlessly be modified so as to destroy all ''pretending'' equilibria which dominate the truth-telling one.