A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR WALRASIAN SOCIAL CHOICE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
NAGAHISA, RI
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1010
发表日期：
1994
页码：
186-208
关键词：
摘要：
The purpose of this paper is: (i) to amend a result of Gevers [Walrasian social choice: Some simple axiomatic approaches, in ''Social Choice and Public Decision Making: Essays in Honor of K. J. Arrow'' (Heller et al, Eds.), Vol. 1, Cambridge Univ. Press, London/New York, 1986] on Walrasian social choice, and (ii) to characterize Walrasian allocations in terms of social choice axioms when the number of agents grows infinitely large in Debreu-Scarf's fashion. Based on Debreu-Scarf's core convergence theorem, we prove the Walras rule is the only rule satisfying the Core property, Non-discrimination, Generalized Monotonicity, and Local Decisiveness. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.