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作者：ABREU, D; MATSUSHIMA, H
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：We study implementation of social choice functions when the planner can randomize and impose arbitrarily small fines on players. In complete information environments with three or more players, it is shown that any social choice function is exactly implementable in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. The mechanisms used are finite and robust to the order of removal of dominated strategies.
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作者：RIVARD, BA
摘要：This paper constructs a simple overlapping generations model with money and production in an environment of monopolistically competitive firms and an increasing returns to scale production technology. Within this framework symmetric stationary sunspot equilibria are generated without requiring the assumption of gross complementarity between future consumption and current leisure. Output fluctuations may also be highly persistent in this model.
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作者：GLOVER, J
摘要：This note considers a principal-multi-agent model of a firm subject to adverse selection. With just the usual optimal (incentive-constrained) contracts being offered, there exist multiple (Bayes-Nash) equilibria in the agents' subgame. Moreover, from the agents' perspective, there exists an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the equilibrium desired by the principal. By exploiting the structure of the model, this note develops a new approach for eliminating unwanted equilibria (while retaining t...
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作者：SHIGOKA, T
摘要：We show how to construct stationary sunspot equilibria in a continuous time model, where equilibrium is indeterminate near either a steady state or a closed orbit. Woodford's conjecture that the indeterminacy of equilibrium implies the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria remains valid in a continuous time model. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：CAMPBELL, DE; NAGAHISA, RI
作者单位：Kansai University
摘要：A social welfare function f maps the family of profiles of economic preferences into the set of continuous and quasitransitive relations on the space of allocations of public and/or private goods. If f satisfies Arrow's independence axiom and an extremely mild responsiveness condition, then f must be oligarchical. However, Pareto aggregation is the only oligarchical rule that does not completely exclude someone from consideration or invert someone's preference ordering before incorporating it ...
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作者：MOULIN, H; SHENKER, S
作者单位：Xerox
摘要：A finite group of agents share a (one output) production function. A cost sharing rule allocates the total cost among the users for every conceivable profile of output demands. We investigate the space of possible cost sharing rules from an axiomatic perspective. We provide two characterizations of average cost pricing, one based on the axioms of Additivity and Monotonicity (both with respect to the cost function), and the other based on the axioms of Additivity and a version of Consistency. W...
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作者：THOMSON, W
摘要：We consider the problem of fairly allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. We search for methods of performing this division, or solutions, that satisfy the following property of consistency: any recommendation made for any economy is in agreement with the recommendation made for any ''reduced'' economy obtained by imagining the departure of some of the agents with their allotted consumptions. Our main result is that essentially all efficient su...
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作者：BALDER, EJ; RUSTICHINI, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Balder (Math. Oper. Res. 13 (1988), 265-276) gave an existence result for a Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete information. This game had finitely many players. Here it is shown that his analysis can be extended to deal with infinitely many players.
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作者：DOW, J; WERLANG, SRD
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal-form games in the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Using the formalization of Schmeidler and Gilboa, we show that Nash equilibrium exists for any degree of uncertainty aversion, that maximin behaviour can occur even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense, and that backward induction breaks down in the twice repeated prisoners' dilemma. We relate these results to the literature on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemm...
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作者：GOENKA, A
摘要：This paper studies the effect of different rationing or income supplement schemes on equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, the question is whether the rationing schemes are successful in neutralizing extrinsic uncertainty, i.e., are stable against sunspots. Under direct, quantify rationing the equilibria are not affected by sunspots. Under value rationing, where the value spent on a group of commodities is restricted through the use of coupons, the equilibria can be affected by self-fulfilling b...
