2期

最新文章

• Optimal contract, imperfect output observation, and limited liability AI翻译
  作者：Lawarree, JP; VanAudenrode, MA
  作者单位：Laval University
  摘要：We study the optimal contract when output is imperfectly observed. When all parties are risk neutral and the agent has unlimited liability, the optimal contract remains the same regardless of whether the output is perfectly or imperfectly observed. When the agent's liability becomes limited, the optimal contract changes profoundly under imperfect information. We show that the hi,oh-productivity agent never produces at first-best and may be required to produce an effort lower than the one requi...
• Reputation and entry deterrence under short-run ownership of a firm AI翻译
  作者：Aoyagi, M
  摘要：This paper discusses the role of the changing ownership of a long-run firm facing a sequence of potential entrants to its market, When there is uncertainty about the firm's type (about its cost of taking an aggressive action) that is observed only by the current owner, it is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which each generation of owners takes the same aggressive action to deter entry regardless of the type. Under a natural refinement of equilibrium beliefs, the path induced by this ...
• D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types AI翻译
  作者：Ramey, G
  摘要：This note extends Cho and Sobel's (J. Econ. Theory 50 (1990), 381-413) existence and uniqueness results for D1 equilibria of signaling games with multiple signals by (i) specifying that types are drawn from a compact interval, and (ii) invoking a more general incentive monotonicity condition, due to Engers (Econometrica 55 (1987), 663-674) which extends the usual single-crossing property of one-signal models. For certain classes of payoff functions, the complete-information distortion result o...
• Arrow's theorem in public good environments with convex technologies AI翻译
  作者：Duggan, J
  摘要：I prove a version of Arrow's theorem for public good environments assuming that individuals have standard economic preferences and that the domain of feasible sets consists of the convex, compact, comprehensive subsets of alternatives. This improves a result of Donaldson and Weymark (J. Econ. Theory 46 (1988), 291-308), who employ non-convex feasible sets in their proof. I use their strengthened independence condition, and I interpret my result as a reflection of its undue restrictiveness. As ...
• Correlated equilibrium of cournot oligopoly competition AI翻译
  作者：Liu, LH
  摘要：This paper shows that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, which is the unique Nash equilibrium, for the standard Cournot oligopoly model with linear demand and asymmetric, linear costs. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Rationalizable predatory pricing AI翻译
  作者：Roth, D
  摘要：This paper shows that predatory pricing is rationalizable and is in this sense rational even when there is no uncertainty regarding structural parameters such as cost or demand. Predatory pricing is modelled as a war of attrition. All strategy profiles-including all possible lengths of predatory battles-are rationalizable in the extensive form. Despite this, weak restrictions on beliefs combined with rationalizability have drastic implications for the play of the game. (C) 1996 Academic Press,...
• Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games AI翻译
  作者：Aoyagi, M
  摘要：The paper Formulates a simple two-person model of learning with pattern recognition and discusses its implications. In particular, it focuses on the asymptotic behavior of players' beliefs when the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Acyclicity and decisiveness structures AI翻译
  作者：Truchon, L
  作者单位：Laval University; Aix-Marseille Universite
  摘要：J. A. Ferejohn and P. C. Fishburn [J. Econ. Theory 21 (1979), 28-45] prove a condition for the acyclicity of binary decision rules, which generalizes all conditions found previously in the literature. Their condition has a combinatorial aspect and is not easy to interpret, let alone to verify. This payer studies how their condition is related to more simple and more operational ones. Six conditions are shown to imply their condition and to be implied by their condition under appropriate assump...
• Information, liquidity, and asset trading in a random matching game AI翻译
  作者：Hopenhayn, HA; Werner, IM
  作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Stanford University
  摘要：This paper develops a sequential random matching model of asset trading to analyze how the extent of information about an asset that is available in the market can affect its tradeability. Liquidity traders are rational agents with higher impatience, which make optimal intertemporal consumption decisions given the trading constraints. Information asymmetries result in unexecuted trades. Agents who want to consume relatively early optimally choose to exchange initial assets for new assets that ...
• The partnered core of a game without side payments AI翻译
  作者：Reny, PJ; Wooders, MH
  作者单位：University of Toronto
  摘要：A payoff for a game is partnered if it admits no asymmetric dependencies. We introduce the partnered core of a game without side payments and show that the partnered core of a balanced game is nonempty. The result is a strengthening of Scarfs Theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced game without side payments. In addition. it is shown that if there are at most a countable number of points in the partnered core of a game then at least one core point is minimally partnered, meaning ...