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最新文章

• Allocation rules for a commonly owned technology: The average cost lower bound AI翻译
  作者：Maniquet, F
  摘要：Assume that a set of individuals commonly own a one input one output technology. Al an average cost pricing equilibrium allocation, the consumption/contribution ratio is identical among agents and each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. The following requirement is introduced: every agent must be as well off at a selected allocation as at the average cost equilibrium that all agents prefer. The paper establishes compatibilities and incompatibilities between this requirement and some...
• Optimal repeated purchases when sellers are learning about costs AI翻译
  作者：Burguet, R
  摘要：A buyer repeatedly purchases some good. Suppliers privately learn their cost only upon producing at least once. Efficiency would imply sampling sellers until one is found with cost lower than a (increasing with time) reservation value. Then the good would be permanently purchased from the seller with lowest cost. A sequence of second-price auctions with participation premia and entry fees is shown to be both efficient and optimal for the buyer. An alternative calls for price offers by informed...
• Voting with ballots and feet: Existence of equilibrium in a local public good economy AI翻译
  作者：Konishi, H
  摘要：This paper proves a general existence theorem for equilibrium in a local public good economy with free mobility by extending Greenberg and Shitovitz's (J. Econ. Theory 46, 1988, 223-236) approach. Each jurisdiction's collective choice rule is the d-majority voting rule proposed by Greenberg (Econometrica 47, 1979, 627-636). Spillover effects of local public goods, externalities due to the population distribution, and snob effects are all allowed. We need transitivity and completeness of prefer...
• Reputation and dynamic stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games AI翻译
  作者：Aoyagi, M
  摘要：The paper studies a repeated game in which a long-run player without discounting faces another long-run player with strict discounting. The game is perturbed so that there is uncertainty in the patient player's strategy choice: she may be a rational player. but she may also be one of many irrational types who are committed to various repeated game strategies, The rational patient player's equilibrium payoff in this perturbed game is analyzed. In particular, it is shown that the lower bound on ...
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games AI翻译
  作者：Cripps, MW; Schmidt, KM; Thomas, JP
  作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Bonn
  摘要：The paper analyzes reputation effects in perturbed repeated games with discounting. If there is some positive prior probability that one of the players is committed to play the same (pure) action in every period, then this provides a lower bound for her equilibrium playoff in all Nash equilibria. This bound is tight and independent of what other types have positive probability. It is generally lower than Fudenberg and Levine's bound for games with a long-run player facing a sequence of short-r...
• Cores and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities and lotteries AI翻译
  作者：Garratt, R; Qin, CZ
  摘要：Lotteries are introduced in the exchange model of Shapley and Scarf (J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974), 23-37). In competition, traders buy and sell probabilities on houses. When considering the core, feasible allocations of the economy and blocking allocations of coalitions may involve lotteries. Among other results, we show that the set of lottery equilibrium allocations is non-empty and does not contain all competitive equilibrium allocations, the core of the Shapley/Scarf model is a strict subset of...
• Continuous extensions of an order on a set to the power set AI翻译
  作者：Nehring, K; Puppe, C
  作者单位：University of Vienna
  摘要：The paper addresses the problem of extending an order on a set to a ranking of its subsets based on principles of independence and continuity. The central result is a characterization of rankings that depend on the maximal and minimal element only. The independence condition used in this result is contrasted with a stronger independence condition prevalent in the literature on complete ignorance problems in decision making under uncertainty and-under a different interpretation-also in the lite...
• Criteria for distributive equity: Characterization in terms of share value AI翻译
  作者：Otsuki, M
  摘要：Taking up three criteria. namely, egalitarian equivalence, guarantee of equal split, and Freedom from envy. the present paper considers conditions under which each of these equity criteria satisfies the desiderata of resource monotonicity and population solidarity. These conditions are presented in a uniform fashion, after definition of the equity criteria in terms of share value. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Dynamic monopoly with nondurable goods AI翻译
  作者：Dudey, M
  摘要：A nondurable good monopolist who posts a single price will generally achieve an inefficient outcome. But is it possible that the monopolist would achieve efficiency by repeatedly posting prices before delivery? If buyers recognize the effect of current purchases on future prices, then under complementary ideal conditions, the answer is yes. On the other hand traditional concerns about monopoly are viable if the seller bears a small cost per buyer of market reopening. (C) 1996 Academic Press, I...
• Symmetric smooth consumption externalities AI翻译
  作者：Cres, H
  作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
  摘要：Based on Arrow's model of a pure exchange economy with smooth consumption externalities. this paper studies how the internalization of external effects through a network of markets between agents introduces symmetry breakings in the set of equilibria. ir shows indeed how identical agents can be treated asymmetrically by complete markets, This work emphasizes that equilibrium allocations may be very sensitive to the way Coase-type rights are distributed. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.