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作者：Sorin, S
作者单位：Universite Paris Nanterre
摘要：Strategic market games describe mechanisms of formation of prices and of redistribution of goods. We introduce here a model without commodity money but where the use of fiat money does not imply the possibility of debt, hence the necessity for penalty. This is done through a collection of exchange rates that allows For a coherent price system and a redistribution that clears the market for any initial bids of the agents. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Conlon, JR
摘要：It is shown that, in finitely repeated smooth games, epsilon-equilibria are capable of supporting full cooperation up to very near the end of the horizon, with very small amounts of irrationality, epsilon. Furthermore, behavior, even near the end of the horizon, is highly insensitive to the amount of irrationality assumed. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Smith, JL; Levin, D
摘要：This paper ranks first- and second-price, independent value auctions with risk-averse bidders when entry is endogenous. Unless bidders exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), the ''fixed-n'' ranking of first-price over second-price is sustained. However, when bidders exhibit DARA, we show that the effect of entry sometimes reverses the ranking. We discuss how elements of the auction environment such as the relative magnitude of entry costs, the number of potential bidders, and the de...
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作者：Gottardi, P; Hens, T
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Bonn
摘要：The paper studies the role and the formulation of the survival assumption with incomplete markets. We are able to show the existence of a competitive equilibrium when the agents' endowments lie on the boundary of their consumption set However, for this some additional assumptions with respect to the complete market case are needed. These are joint restrictions on the asset structure and the distribution of the endowments and preferences. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Legros, P; Newman, AF
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital. Effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid, and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem. Because incentives vary with an agent's wealth, different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances. When borrowing is not costly, firms essentially consist of one typ...
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作者：Fields, GS; Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Income mobility may be seen as arising from two sources: (i) the transfer of income among individuals with total income held constant, and (ii) a change in the total amount of income available. In this paper, we propose several sensible properties defining the concept of income mobility and show that an easily applicable measure of mobility is uniquely implied by these properties. We also show that the resulting measure is additively decomposable into the two sources listed above, namely, mobi...
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作者：Volij, O
摘要：Aumann and Brandenburger [Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161-1180.] provide sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for their beliefs to constitute a Nash equilibrium. They assume, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, it is meant that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs. There is, however, no need to restrict the notion of rationality to expected utility maximization. This paper shows that thei...
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作者：Lo, KC
摘要：Existing equilibrium concepts for games make use of the subjective expected utility model axiomatized by Savage [28] to represent players' preferences. Accordingly, each player's beliefs about the strategies played by opponents are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsbeg Paradox demonstrating that the beliefs of a decision maker may not be representable by a probability measure, this paper generalizes equilibrium concepts for normal form gam...
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作者：Loffler, A
摘要：It is shown that if traded portfolios form a convex cone (of dimension greater than two) containing the riskless asset, strict variance aversion and strict monotonicity in the riskless asset imply the mu-sigma(2)-criterion. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Tadelis, S
摘要：This paper extends the applications of the theory of social situations. In particular, we investigate characteristics of optimistic stable standards of behavior (OSSBs) in repeated extensive form games. The OSSB is interesting for two reasons: First, it refines subgame perfect equilibrium, Second, it strongly relates to von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable sets, We characterize the nondiscriminating OSSB and derive a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique nondiscriminating OSSB-...
