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作者:Robson, AJ
摘要:A biological model is developed here to determine the fittest attitude to risk. With a fixed environment, the type maximizing expected offspring is selected. This yields the expected utility theorem when translated into a criterion for evaluating gambles over commodities. With a random environment, however, the type selected is strictly less averse to idiosyncratic risk than to risk which is correlated across all individuals. The implied criterion for choice over gambles does not satisfy the e...
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作者:Balasko, Y; Royer, D
作者单位:heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
摘要:We study the stability of competitive equilibria for recursive processes considered in the learning litterature. We define h-stability (resp. F-stability, resp. infinity-stability) to mean stability for the least squares h-process (resp. h-stability for some finite h, resp, with respect to the infinite least squares learning process). We show that h-stability implies h'-stability for h
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作者:Burke, JL
摘要:We prove the existence of general equilibrium for continuous-time overlapping-generations models. Previous theorems exclude all non-linear C.E.S, and von Neumann- Morgenstern preferences and exclude production. Our primitive assumptions are satisfied by such preferences and by all Markovian production technologies satisfying Bewley's assumptions for Arrow-Debreu models provided that storage is possible, at some finite rate of depreciation and some positive capacity. A non-existence example sho...
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作者:Dhillon, A; Mertens, JF
摘要:The (epsilon)-perfect correlated equilibria (PCE) are those induced by a (epsilon)-perfect equilibrium of some correlation device. The ''revelation principle'' fails for this concept-the direct mechanism map not yield a perfect equilibrium. The approximately perfect correlated equilibria (APCE) are the limits of epsilon-PCE, and we obtain a full characterisation for them. Even the APCE are ''acceptable.'' We argue in an example that, among those, it is the PCE which seem the ''right'' concept....
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作者:Kara, T; Sonmez, T
摘要:We consider the Nash implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational solutions in the context of matching problems. We show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these solutions, we show that the ''lower bound'' stable rule and the ''upper bound'' Pareto and individually rational rule are Nash implementable. The proofs of these results are by means of a recent technique developed by Danilov [2]. Two corollaries of interest are the stable rule is the minima...
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作者:Piccione, M; Tan, GF
摘要:This paper studies the equilibrium bidding behavior in a first-price sealed-bid auction when the number of informed bidders is not common knowledge. Both the independent private values and the common value cases are analyzed, under the assumption that a ''neutral'' signal exists. In equilibrium, experts and non-experts draw their bids from distinct supports: experts bid in the upper and lower tail of the bidding distribution and non-experts randomize their bids in between. For common values, i...
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作者:Mitra, T
摘要:This paper explores the precise extent of discounting needed to generate period-three cycles in a standard aggregative dynamic optimization framework. It is shown that there is a ''universal constant'', M = [(root 5 - 1)/2](2) approximate to 0.3819, such that (i) if an optimal program of any dynamic optimization model exhibits a period-three cycle, then the discount factor is less than M; and (ii) if the discount factor is smaller than M, then it is possible ro construct a transition possibili...
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作者:Arya, A; Glover, J; Young, R
作者单位:Carnegie Mellon University
摘要:In applied models, the choice of a particular incomplete information structure appears to have been motivated primarily by technical convenience. The information structures used can be classified as either probabilistic or partitional. Information is probabilistic if no agent can rule out any type profile of the remaining agents and, for at]east one type of one agent, the conditional and marginal probability distributions over the remaining agents' types are not equal. information is partition...
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作者:Blackorby, C; Bossert, W; Donaldson, D
作者单位:Aix-Marseille Universite; University of Waterloo
摘要:On the basis of variable-population considerations, we characterize multi-valued bargaining solutions that are rationalized by special cases of the generalized Gini orderings. In addition to some fixed-population axioms, we use versions of the well-known consistency principle to characterize the single-series Gini bargaining solutions and some of their subclasses (including the utilitarian solution). By adding a replication invariance condition, we provide a characterization of the single-para...
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作者:deVilder, R
作者单位:University of Amsterdam
摘要:In this paper we investigate the global behaviour of the output equilibrium time paths in a two-dimensional overlapping generations model with productive investment and capital accumulation, where agents behave rationally and markets are competitive. We show that equilibrium time paths can converge to complicated (chaotic) attractors as well as periodic attractors when the substitution effect dominates the income effect everywhere. The occurrence of complicated equilibrium paths is guaranteed ...