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作者：Häckner, J
作者单位：Stockholm University
摘要：In this note we show that the results developed in N. Singh and X. Vives (1984, Rand J. Econ, 15, 546-554) are sensitive to the duopoly assumption. If there are more than two firms, prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition. This will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements. If goods are substitutes, high-quality firms may earn higher profits under price competition than under quantity competition. Hence, it is not evident which...
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作者：Koçkesen, L; Ok, EA; Sethi, R
作者单位：Columbia University; New York University; Columbia University
摘要：We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payoffs. Specifically, a subset of players have negatively interdependent preferences and care not about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others. We identify sufficient conditions under which members of the latter group have a strategic advantage in the following sense: at all intragrou...
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作者：Aiyagari, SR; Williamson, SD
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Iowa
摘要：We construct a model with private information in which consumers write dynamic contracts with financial intermediaries. A role for money arises due to random limited participation of consumers in the financial market. Without defection constraints, a Friedman rule is optimal, the mean and variability of wealth tend to fall with inflation in the steady state, and the welfare effects of inflation are very small. With defection constraints, the effects of inflation on the distribution of welfare ...
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作者：Kessler, AS
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies a stylized three-layer agency framework in which a principal hires a supervisor to monitor an agent's productive effort. It is demonstrated that the possibility of collusion imposes no additional cost on the principal if the supervisor's report is hard information, i.e., monitoring evidence call only be concealed and not forged. This result holds irrespective of the nature of the penalty that can be imposed on the agent. The findings suggest that it is strictly better for th...
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作者：Schummer, J
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider allocation rules that choose outcomes and transfers, based on agents' reported valuations of the outcomes. A bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both. A bribe-proof rule eliminates such opportunities. We show that under a bribe-proof rule, each agent's payoff is a continuous function of other agents' reported valuations. Furthermore, on connected domains, if the set of outcomes is finite or the domain is ...
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作者：Dumas, B; Uppal, R; Wang, T
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Pennsylvania; University of British Columbia
摘要：In this article, our objective is to determine efficient allocations in economies with multiple agents having recursive, non-time-additive utility functions. Our main result is to show that in a multi-agent economy, the problem of determining efficient allocations can be characterized in terms of a single value function (that of a social planner), rather than multiple functions (one for each investor), as has been proposed thus far (D. Duffie et al., 1994, J. Math. Econ. 23, 133-146). We then ...
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作者：Che, YK; Gale, I
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Georgetown University
摘要：This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget-constrained. We consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with ic quasilinear utility function. If the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint, textbook monopoly pricing is optimal. By contrast, the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonlinear pricing, to commit to a declining price sequence, to require the buyer to disclose his budget. ...
