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作者：Faig, M
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper extends thr income fluctuations problem to an economy with endogenous growth. Individuals. instead of owning a stream of endowments, accumulate capital with an investment irreversibility constraint and lace uninsurable idiosyncratic risks to the return to capital. Money provides both a risk diversification and a liquidity role. Balanced growth paths exist despite the increasing dispersion of the wealth distribution. The return to money cannot be equated to the social return to capit...
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作者：Kelly, DL; Shorish, J
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：In this paper we examine a representative agent forecasting prices in a first-order self-referential overlapping generations model. We first consider intermediate stage learning, where agents update the forecasting rule every m periods. We show that, in theory and simulations, the learning rule does not converge to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE). We next consider two stage learning, where agents learn the functional mapping between the current forecast function and the previous fo...
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作者：Blackorby, C; Brett, C
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Essex
摘要：We analyze how constitutional restrictions on tax base within a federation affect the nature of Pareto-improving directions or tax reform and the design of optimal federal taxes. We show that constraints on federal taxation entail production, inefficiency at the optimum. except under very restrictive circumstances. In passing, we show that using consumer prices as control variables-a standard procedure in tax-reform analysis-rather than the taxes themselves, leads to incorrect conclusions when...
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作者：Cai, HB
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study bargaining situations in which one side consists of a group of people, who elect a representative to bargain with another party on their behalf. A two-phase bargaining model is developed in which a principal-agent problem between the constituency and its representative is embedded. With a natural refinement of sequential equilibrium, we characterize the set of equilibria and examine its efficiency properties. We show that agency problems in the delegation relationship rather than asym...
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作者：Al-Najjar, NI; Smorodinsky, R
作者单位：Northwestern University; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：A player's influence relative to a mechanism and opponents' strategies is the maximum difference his action can make in the expected value of a collective outcome. A player is alpha-pivotal if his influence exceeds a threshold alpha. We provide tight bounds on the number of pivotal players and on average influence. These bounds are uniform over all mechanisms and action profiles and are achieved at mechanisms that take the form of a majority rule. We illustrate our analysis with an example of ...
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作者：Ramos, HM; Ollero, J; Sordo, MA
作者单位：Universidad de Cadiz
摘要：In this paper, a sufficient condition for non-negative random variables to be ordered in the Generalized Lorenz sense is presented. This condition does not involve inverse distribution functions. Applications of this result to several income distribution models are given. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D36, D69. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Einy, E; Moreno, D; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Haifa
摘要：We show that the fine core of an atomless exchange economy with differential information is a subset of the ex- post core of the economy. (This inclusion may be proper; and it does not hold for economies with a finite number of traders.) Consequently. every fine core allocation is a selection from the equilibrium correspondence of thr associated family, of full information economies, Moreover, when each, trader knows his or her own utility function and his of her own endowment, every fine core...
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作者：Cai, HB
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper analyzes a complete-information, infinite-horizon, multilateral bargaining model in which one player bargains with each of the other players one at a time and binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. Under a weak stationarity condition on equilibrium strategies, we characterize the set of equilibria for the game. We show that when players are sufficiently patient, significant delay in reaching agreements may emerge and this delay can become longer quickly as the...
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作者：Peters, M
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper studies finite versions of competitive matching models in which sellers announce prices and buyers understand the relationship between price and probability of trade. Two equilibrium concepts are studied for finite games, subgame perfect equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium. It is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers under both equilibrium concepts converges weakly to the same competitive equilibrium distribution of prices. Furthermore, the payoffs t...
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作者：Samet, D
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Beliefs about quantities are expressed by estimations. Beliefs are quantified by ascribing to them probability numbers. It is, shown that beliefs about quantities and quantified beliefs give rise to the same model, that of a type space. We study the axiom that an agent's estimation coincides with the estimation of that estimation, showing it to be weaker than the introspection axiom, according to which an agent is certain of his own probabilistic beliefs. It implies, however, that the agent is...
