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作者：DeMichelis, S; Germano, F
作者单位：University of Pavia; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We show a fundamental property of dynamics whose zeros are essentially the Nash equilibria of underlying games. namely. the indices of zeros coincide with the degrees of the projection from the graph of the Nash correspondence onto the underlying space of games. This is important since it implies that ibr a wide class of dynamics local stability propel ties of zeros are determined by the geometry of the Nash correspondence, providing further links between learning or evolutionary game theory, ...
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作者：Fraser, CD
作者单位：University of Leicester; University of Leicester
摘要：Using the homogeneous of degree zero inverse congestion (quality) function employed most frequently in the literature, we characterise completely the families of utility Functions which are then necessary and sufficient for break-even utilitarian welfare maximising provision of club goods with self-selection to be separable from distribution. Two types of separation-involving, alternatively (a) the price and quality; (b) the price, duality, facility size and total utilisation-are considered. W...
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作者：Corradi, V; Sarin, R
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Continuous approximations that are ordinary differential equations (ODEs) or stochastic differential equations (SDEs) are often used to study the properties of discrete stochastic processes. We show that different ways of taking the continuous limit of the same model may result in either an ODE or a SDE and study the manner in which each approximates the discrete model. We compare the asymptotic properties of the continuous equations with those of the discrete dynamics and show that they tend ...
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作者：Ginés, M; Marhuenda, F
作者单位：Universitat Jaume I; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three axioms: Pareto optimality, symmetry, and solidarity. This last property requires that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public goods of some of the agents should not decrease the welfare of any of them. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Lipman, BL; Wang, RQ
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Queens University - Canada
摘要：We add small costs of changing actions and frequent repetition to finitely repeated games, making some surprising commitments credible. Naturally, switching costs make it credible not to change action. However, this can occur for small switching costs and gives a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in coordination games when Pareto dominance and risk dominance coincide. In the Prisoners' Dilemma, switching costs reduce the incentive to deviate from mutual cooperation, but reduce the incentive t...
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作者：Grant, S; Kajii, A; Polak, B
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Tsukuba; Yale University
摘要：Savage motivated his sure-thing principle by arguing that, whenever an act would be preferred if an event obtains and preferred if that event did not obtain, it should be preferred overall. The ability to decompose and recompose decision problems in this way has normative appeal. It does not. however, require the full separability embodied in Savage's axiom. We formulate a weaker axiom that suffices for decomposability. and show it is almost equivalent to Gul and Lantto's dynamic programming s...
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作者：Foster, JE; Shneyerov, AA
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper explores a natural decomposition property motivated by Shorrocks (1980, Econometrica 48, 613-625) and Anand (1983, Inequality and poverty in Malaysia, Oxford University Press) that we call path indepentent decomposability. Between-group inequality is found by applying the inequality measure to the smoothed distribution, which replaces each income in a subgroup with its representative income. Within-group inequality is the measure applied to the standardized distribution, which resca...
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作者：Hanany, E; Safra, Z
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：In this paper we present necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of ordinal Nash outcomes. These outcomes are derived from the ordinal Nash solution-a reinterpretation and an extension of the Nash bargaining solution that allows bargainers to have preference relations that are more general than expected utility. Our task is undertaken by the construction of a new notion called induced utilities. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78. (C) 2000 Academ...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Müller, HM
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：In a seminal paper, B. R. Holmstrom and P. R. Milgrom 1987 Econometrica 55, 303-328) examine a principal-agent model in which the agent continuously controls the drift rate of a Brownian motion. Given a stationary environment, they show that the optimal sharing rule is a linear function of aggregated output. This paper considers a variant of the Brownian model in which control revisions take place in discrete time. It is shown that no matter how close discrete time is to continuous time, the f...
