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作者：Fernandes, A; Phelan, C
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：We present general recursive methods to handle environments where privately observed variables are linked over time. We show that incentive compatible contracts are implemented recursively with a threat keeping constraint in addition to the usual temporary incentive compatibility and promise keeping conditions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D30, D31, D80, D82. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Shinkai, T
摘要：I consider a three-player Stackelberg. game where each player has its private signal concerning stochastic demand. I show that at a perfectly revealing equilibrium, the second mover earns the lowest and the third mover the highest expected profit of the three. I characterize this result by the strategic substitutes or complements relationships among three firms at the equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, and L13. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Citanna, A; Villanacci, A
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Florence
摘要：We compare rational expectations equilibria with different degrees of information revelation through prices. These equilibria arise in a two-period exchange economy with finitely many states and signals, multiple commodities and incomplete financial markets for nominal assets. We show that there are always equilibria where information is redundant in the sense of being of no value to the uninformed traders. We give conditions under which for a generic set of economies, parametrized by endowmen...
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作者：Ghirardato, P; Le Breton, M
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：Consider a decision problem under uncertainty for a decision maker with known (utility) payoffs over prizes. We say that an act is Choquet (Shafer, Bernoulli),rational if for some capacity (belief function, probability) over the set of states, it maximizes her expected utility. We show that an act may be Choquet rational without being Bernoulli rational, but it is Choquet rational if and only if it is Shafer rational. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.;(C) 2000 Ac...
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作者：Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We analyze collective choices in game forms from a revealed preference viewpoint. We call the joint choice behavior of n agents Nash- (respectively, Pareto-) rationalizable if there exist n preferences over the conceivable joint actions such that the joint actions selected from each game form coincide with the Nash equilibria (respectively, the Pareto optima) of the corresponding game. In the two-agent case, we show that every deterministic joint behavior which is Nash-rationalizable is also P...
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作者：Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：Consider a large population of finitely-lived agents organized into n different hierarchical levels. Every period, all those placed at each level are randomly matched to play a given symmetric game. Based on the resulting outcome, a rho-fraction of agents who (within their own level) attain the highest payoffs are promoted upwards. On the other hand, newcomers replacing those who die every period enter at the lowest level and choose irreversibly the strategy to be played for the rest of their ...
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作者：Olson, LJ; Roy, S
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; State University System of Florida; Florida International University
摘要：We examine the efficiency of conservation of a renewable resource whose natural productivity is influenced by random environmental disturbances. We allow for non-concave biological production and stock-dependent social welfare. Unlike deterministic models, conservation may be inefficient no matter how productive the resource growth function is. In addition, improvements in the natural productivity of the resource might increase the possibility of extinction. We characterize the conditions on s...
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作者：Burke, JL
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Indianapolis
摘要：After dropping the standard general-equilibrium assumption that preference orders discount future consumption faster than the economy grows and dropping continuity and weakening utility representation, we establish commodity prices and consumptions that approach approximate equilibrium to within any practical tolerance. The Weizacker-overtaking criterion defines the best-known non-standard-discounting orders we admit over discrete-time. deterministic consumption paths and over continuous-time,...
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作者：Sobel, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Economic theorists have intensively studied learning in games and decisions over the last decade. This essay puts some of the work in perspective and offers opinions about what still needs to be learned. Journal Or Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D83. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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作者：Feinberg, Y
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：It is shown that if agents cannot agree to disagree then, under an appropriate compactness condition their beliefs are derivable from a common prior-establishing the converse to the agreement theorem of Aumann (1976, Ann. Statist. 4, 1236-1239). This enables us to formulate the existence of a common prior in syntactic terms, i.e., making no use of the space of states of the world, but referring only to the current knowledge and beliefs of the agents. An example demonstrates that the compactnes...
