Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peters, M
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2667
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 139-168
• 关键词: Matching; ex ante pricing

摘要

This paper studies finite versions of competitive matching models in which sellers announce prices and buyers understand the relationship between price and probability of trade. Two equilibrium concepts are studied for finite games, subgame perfect equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium. It is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers under both equilibrium concepts converges weakly to the same competitive equilibrium distribution of prices. Furthermore, the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D41, D45. (C) 2000 Academic Press.