On the core of an economy with differential information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Einy, E; Moreno, D; Shitovitz, B
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2673
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 262-270
• 关键词: differential information; tine core; ex-post core; rational expectations equilibrium

摘要

We show that the fine core of an atomless exchange economy with differential information is a subset of the ex- post core of the economy. (This inclusion may be proper; and it does not hold for economies with a finite number of traders.) Consequently. every fine core allocation is a selection from the equilibrium correspondence of thr associated family, of full information economies, Moreover, when each, trader knows his or her own utility function and his of her own endowment, every fine core allocation Is a rational expectations equilibrium allocation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D50. (C) 2000 Academic Press.