Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cai, HB
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2658
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 260-276
• 关键词: Multilateral bargaining; Complete information; delay; Coase Theorem

摘要

This paper analyzes a complete-information, infinite-horizon, multilateral bargaining model in which one player bargains with each of the other players one at a time and binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. Under a weak stationarity condition on equilibrium strategies, we characterize the set of equilibria for the game. We show that when players are sufficiently patient, significant delay in reaching agreements may emerge and this delay can become longer quickly as the number of involved parties rises. Indeed, when the number of bargainers is large, perpetual disagreement can occur in equilibrium. (C) 2000 Academic Press.