Information in conflicts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wärneryd, K
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00006-1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 121-136
• 关键词: CONFLICT; Contest; asymmetric information; all-pay auction

摘要

We consider two-player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value. For settings where one player knows the value of the prize, while the other only knows its prior distribution, we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent. In the special case of a lottery contest, equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.