Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Segal, I
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00114-5
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 147-181
• 关键词: coordination; DISCRIMINATION; unique implementation; supermodular games; potential; simultaneous and sequential Cournot adjustment (tatonnement)

摘要

The paper studies bilateral contracting between N agents and one principal, whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents. It examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from (i) coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium, and (ii) making different contracts available to different agents. These effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more. The prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case, and have little or no effect in the latter case. The inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities, and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.