Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haile, PA
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00010-8
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 72-110
• 关键词: Auctions; resale markets; endogenous valuations; signaling; Winner's curse; loser's curse

摘要

When an auction is followed by an opportunity for resale, bidder valuations are endogenously determined, reflecting anticipated profit from buying/selling in the resale market. These valuations vary with the resale market structure, can differ across auction types, and may be lower or higher than if resale were impossible. Although resale introduces a common value element to the model, revenue equivalence can hold; when it fails, this is due not to affiliation but to differences in information conveyed to the secondary market. Information linkages between markets can also lead to signaling and, in some cases, preclude separation in the auction. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.