Asymmetric English auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krishna, V
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00074-7
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 261-288
• 关键词: Auctions; EFFICIENCY

摘要

This paper studies equilibria of the n-bidder single-object English, or open ascending price, auction in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders. Maskin (in: H. Siebert (Ed.), Privatization, Institut fur Weltwirtschaften der Universitat Kiel, Kiel, 1992, pp. 115-136.) showed that if the values satisfy a single crossing condition, then the two-bidder English auction has an efficient equilibrium. In this paper, two extensions of the single crossing condition, the average crossing condition and the cyclical crossing condition, are introduced. The main result is that under either of these conditions the n-bidder English auction has an efficient equilibrium. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.