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作者：Anderson, CM; Plott, CR; Shimomura, KI; Granat, S
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Rhode Island; University of Osaka
摘要：Scarf (Int. Econ. Rev. 1 (1960) 157) proposed a model of dynamic adjustment in which the standard tatonnement price adjustment process orbits around, rather than converges to, the competitive equilibrium. Hirota (Int. Econ. Rev. 22 (198 1) 46 1) characterized the price paths. We explore the predictions of Scarf's model in a non-tatonnement experimental double auction. The average transaction prices in each period do follow the path predicted by the Scarf and Hirota models. When the model predi...
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作者：Beker, PF
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：This paper challenges the widespread belief that competitive markets favor entrepreneurs who operate efficient technologies. In the context of a dynamically incomplete markets model, I show that, ceteris paribus, entrepreneurs operating efficient technologies can be driven out of a competitive market by entrepreneurs operating inefficient technologies. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Schmitt-Grohé, S; Uribe, M
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky product prices. The theoretical framework is a stochastic production economy. The government finances an exogenous stream of purchases by levying distortionary income taxes, printing money, and issuing nominal non-state-contingent bonds. The main findings of the paper are: First, for a miniscule degree of price stickiness (i.e., many times below available empirical estimates) the optimal volatility of inflation is near zero. Se...
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作者：Krishna, V; Morgan, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We examine the strategic interaction between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker, extending the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrics 50 (1982) 1431). We modify their model to allow for more extensive communication between the two parties and show that face-to-face communication between the expert and the uninformed decision maker followed by a written report from the expert leads to improved information transmission. In (almost) all cases, there exists an equilibrium in...
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作者：Ennis, HM
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：I study the limit rule for bilateral bargaining when agents recognize that the aggregate economy (and thus the match surplus) follows a finite-state Poisson process. The rule derived in this paper is of special importance for decentralized exchange economies with bargaining. Two simple applications are presented to illustrate this fact. The first example is a model of wage bargaining and trade externalities. I show that in such situations sophisticated bargaining tends to increase the volatili...
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作者：Fibich, G; Gavious, A; Sela, A
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Richter, MK; Wong, KC
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：When does a preference relation on a finite set have a concave or a strictly concave utility function? We provide a complete answer. Our proof is an application of the Theorem of the Alternative, and constructs a concave utility if one exists. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Guo, JT; Harrison, SG
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Columbia University
摘要：It has been shown that under perfect competition and constant returns-to-scale, a one-sector real business cycle model may exhibit indeterminacy and sunspots when income tax rates are determined by a balanced-budget rule with a pre-set level of government expenditures. This paper shows that indeterminacy disappears if the government finances endogenous public spending and transfers with fixed income tax rates. Under this type of balanced-budget formulation, the economy exhibits saddle-path sta...
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作者：Manduchi, A
作者单位：Jonkoping University
摘要：A model of advertising and price distributions is investigated whereby each seller can contact different buyers, whose preferences are identical, with different probabilities. The model features a continuum of equilibria parametrized by the ratio of the buyers contacted by one seller-differing across market segments-and by the other sellers. In general, the sellers practice price discrimination across segments. More asymmetric equilibria correspond to higher volumes of transactions and higher ...
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作者：Ben-Shoham, A; Serrano, R; Volij, O
作者单位：Iowa State University; Brown University; Harvard University
摘要：Stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange. We analyze the stochastic stability of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market. In both models, traders meet in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is mutually beneficial, but occasionally they make mistakes. The models differ in the probability of mistakes. When all mistakes are equally likely, the set of stochastically stable allocations contains the set of efficient allocations. When more serious m...
